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Investment banks that develop new corporate securities systemat-
ically lead the new underwriting market despite being imitated early
by equally competitive rivals. We study how innovators and imita-
tors set underwriting fees in order to identify empirically the source
of this advantage. Using data of innovative securities since 1985, we
do nd that innovators set systematically higher fees than imitators.
This premium decreases as more issues occur, and faster for later gen-
eration products. Imitation is also quicker for later generations. This
evidence supports the hypothesis that the innovator has superior skills
in structuring any given issue of the new security.
JEL Classi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Advantageous Innovation and Imitation
in the Underwriting Market
for Corporate Securities
Abstract
Investment banks that develop new corporate securities systematically lead
the new underwriting market despite being imitated early by equally compet-
itive rivals. We study how innovators and imitators set underwriting fees in
order to identify empirically the source of this advantage. Using data of innov-
ative securities since 1985, we do nd that innovators set systematically higher
fees than imitators. This premium decreases as more issues occur, and faster
for later generation products. Imitation is also quicker for later generations.
This evidence supports the hypothesis that the innovator has superior skills in
structuring any given issue of the new security.
JEL Classication: G24, L12, L89.
Keywords: Financial innovation, sequential innovation, investment bank-
ing, underwriters expertise, learning.
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Investment banks have been at the forefront of nancial innovation for more than
two decades, increasing the variety of securities that rms can issue to raise new
funds. The volume that banks underwrite using these products has also taken an
increasing proportion of the overall underwriting market. But innovation is followed
by imitation: large, reputed banks avoid the research and development stage and
compete with the innovator for underwriting mandates of the new security. Yet,
the empirical evidence strongly suggests that the innovators of new securities are
somehow able to preserve a competitive advantage over imitators.
Why this is the case is an open question. In the most recent survey, Tufano (2003)
concludes that the mechanisms that reward innovation still remain to be studied. It
is important and timely to study the source and the evolution of the innovators
advantage if we want to understand the incentives for banks to innovate. Indeed,
authors still debate the wisdom behind the recent changes in the US patent laws
without a measurement of how much banks gain from innovation without patent
protection.1
This paper asks whether the innovators advantage over its imitators comes from
a superior expertise structuring and underwriting issues of the security it has devel-
oped. We con ecture that imitation is seemingly easy but e¤ectively di cult. The
imitator can learn the product design immediately but has to acquires the skills to
structure new issues. This specic ability is private to the innovator but the imitator
learns it as the new security is issued repeatedly.
To test this hypothesis, we employ a novel identication strategy: we compare
the equilibrium underwriting fees of innovators and imitators along the life cycle of
each innovation, and across innovations that occur sequentially. We derive this com-
parison from a stylized representation of underwriter competition, where the e¤ects
over time of the superior expertise hypothesis are clearly distinguished from those
of other sources of bank heterogeneity. In particular, we show that in an equilib-
rium where both banks maximize their probability of getting the next mandate, the
underwriting fee directly re ects the innovation-specic ability di¤erential between
innovator and imitators on top of underwriting costs and client switching cost. If
there is a specic ability to learn, then this di¤erence, and thus the fees, will be
monotonically decreasing in the issue number, ceteris paribus.
We implement the empirical tests with a data set of some of the most signicant
innovations in the last 20 years. We analyze all new issues of equity-linked and corpo-
rate derivative securities found in Thomsons ne Banker data base (formerly SDC).
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These products have become increasingly important not only as a fertile ground for
innovation but also as a large source of funds. Between 1985 and 2002 rms raised
over 200 billion, which represents almost 16 of all the cash raised with common
stock in the same period by all the rms in the US economy.2 This class of securities
has two other key characteristics: a high complexity of the securities structures and
a high variation in the actual engineering choices made by underwriters across issues
(Schroth, 2006). Underwriters given the mandate have to specify a large number of
parameters for each given issuer and investors characteristics at the time of the issue.
Therefore, the banks structuring ability must be an important determinant of this
markets equilibrium.
All the banks that compete for underwriting mandates of innovative securities
are large, reputed Wall Street rms. All of them have had underwriting relation-
ships in the past with most issuers and have the ability to place large issues. We see
that variables traditionally used to measure underwriters competitiveness vary little
across underwriters in these markets. Hence, we exploit variation in two previously
overlooked characteristics of each issue: the issue order within the security and the
generation number of each security. Indeed, these securities can be classied into
product groups (index-tied principal, zero-coupon convertibles, mandatory convert-
ible preferred, etc.). Moreover, innovations within groups occur in an observable
sequence. Further, issues themselves happen sequentially. Univariate comparisons
across generations already reveal that the innovators market share leadership is
smaller for late generations.
The evidence is strongly in favor of the superior expertise hypothesis. We identify
this e¤ect over and above other measures of the competitiveness of underwriters and
show that it is of the rst order. The estimated advantage is inherent to the securitys
innovator and is robust even to the presence of tough imitators. In particular, the
underwriting fees set by innovators are larger than the imitators for given generation
and issue numbers. The innovators fee for the rst issue of rst generations is on
average between 10 and 15 higher than the imitators. The di¤erence is decreasing
in the issue number, at a speed that increases with the generation number. n
average, it takes between 9 and 12 issues of a rst generation security for the imitator
to compete at equal strength with the innovator. It takes less than two issues for 10th
generation securities. This result is consistent with the intuition that later generation
products typically build on a previous designs and are therefore less innovative than
the previous generation, i.e., a smaller innovators initial advantage.
The superior expertise hypothesis also has testable implications about the speed
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of imitation. If the innovator can provide a higher quality structuring and underwrit-
ing, then the probability that the imitator gets its rst underwriting mandate at any
given issue must be decreasing in the innovators initial advantage. ur estimates
of the hazard rate of imitation function show that the expected imitation times are
decreasing with the securitys generation number. Again, these estimates support
our hypothesis and are also fully consistent with the estimates of the fees equations.
The hypothesis that innovators have a superior expertise has not been developed
by the previous literature. There is anecdotal evidence mostly from practitioners
testimonies that suggests that reverse-engineering results in imperfect substitutes and
that the innovator remains the most procient issuer (Toy, 2001).3 Clinical studies of
the investment banking industry document how engineering skills vary across banks
and that the necessary skills to structure the issue of a new corporate security take
time to acquire (Eccles and Crane, 1988). The lack of development of this hypothesis
may have been caused by Tufanos (1989) failure to nd systematic di¤erences in
the underwriting fees of innovators and imitators. Indeed, Tufanos ndings are
inconclusive as to the source of the innovators market leadership. What makes
our results conclusive is the fact that we condition the comparison of fees between
innovator and imitators on the issue timing and the generation number of the security.
The rst formal test that the superior expertise plays an important role in -
nancial innovation is performed by Schroth (2006). He estimates a structural model
for the demand of underwriting services of innovators and imitators. To identify the
innovators advantage, this study focuses on the best way to instrument for under-
writing fees. Here we look directly into the determination of the fees and identify
the underwriters relative abilities from fees data using the model.
Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) theoretically analyze the role of the costs of
switching banks in nancial innovation. They show that innovators can make positive
prots despite fast imitation because they have loyal clienteles. Client loyalty implies
that the innovators prots may not be eroded by imitation, but it also implies
that the advantage belongs to the second mover rather than to the rst: if a bank
can underwrite a perfectly imitated product for its own loyal clientele then, all else
being equal, imitation should be more protable than innovation because it saves
the development costs. Also, we see empirically that even large banks have small
market shares for some innovative products and this generally happens when they
are imitators. We incorporate client loyalty la Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000)
to the model and the empirical tests. The e¤ects of past-relationships based loyalty
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measures on underwriting fees, if any, are very small relative to the e¤ects of superior
expertise.
Authors have mostly focused on the di¤usion of nancial innovation and the
value to its end users (see Frame and White, 2004). Notably, Persons and Warther
(1997) propose an information-based theory of the adoption of nancial innovations
by nancing rms where non-adopters update their beliefs about the true value
of innovative securities from the number of adopters. Thus, innovations di¤use in
waves. Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996) search for the determinants of the speed
of adoption of unk bonds. While this strand of the literature does not attempt to
understand the incentives to innovate, our paper focuses directly on the dynamics
of competition between the agents of corporate nance innovation, i.e., investment
banks, during the innovations life. Riddiough (2001) links the intermediation side
with the investors side of innovation by nding evidence that the structuring of
commercial mortgage-backed securities responds to changes in credit agencies and
investors valuation. Here we also argue that product structuring changes along the
life cycle of a new security, but we take a step further and study the evolution of the
structuring skills of di¤erent banks, and how this di¤erence shapes the incentives to
innovate.
This paper contributes also to the empirical banking literature (see Altinkilic and
Hansen, 2000, for a synthesis). We follow this literature to specify the marginal cost
of underwriting component in the underwriting fee, but we augment the specication
to include the markup due to imperfect competition. Indeed, the size of the markup
is determined in equilibrium as a function of the ability di¤erential between the
innovator and the imitator for given issue and generation numbers.
The evidence in this paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the costs and
benets of the recent strengthening of patents for business methods, which include
most nancial innovations. The evidence here shows that the innovators prots and
market leadership are maintained after imitation occurs but gradually fall over the
life cycle of the new products (as con ectured by Van Horne, 1985). We also see
that, the larger the market, the more mandates the innovator is able to secure early,
e¤ectively delaying the entry of imitators. It seems therefore that there is more need
for patent protection in small, late-generation securities markets. The evidence also
shows that innovation adds little value to the innovator and to the issuer in these
markets. It seems likely then that the increased litigation required to protect such
innovations will be wasteful, and also possible that the innovating banks will not
even use it. Providing an answer to these questions is next in this line of research.
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This paper has the following structure. Section I summarizes the data set and
draws some preliminary conclusions to motivate and shape the empirical design.
Section II lays out the empirical model and the testable implications of the superior
expertise hypothesis. We test these predictions in Sections III and IV. Section
V discusses some extensions to the model and further evidence to support them.
Section VI summarizes the results and concludes brie y. The Appendices contain
further robustness checks of the model and all the proofs.
ata escri tion
We use the New Issues data from Thomson ne Banker to construct a data set
of the market for underwriting mandates of innovative corporate securities. We
include all issues of Equity-linked or Derivative corporate securities. We record
the characteristics of each issue (underwriting fees, the lead underwriter, proceeds,
security type), of its underwriter (e.g., past volume underwritten to date, by security
classes) and of the issuer-underwriter pair (e.g., past relationships counts). As a new
feature, we record also the order in which issues occur within a security type and the
order of the security within the sequence of related innovations.
A Si e o the ne issues ar et
Equity-linked and derivative securities have been issued by corporations since 1985.
There have been 665 issues until 2004 by 30 di¤erent lead underwriters involving 50
di¤erent securities. Each security has a distinct design feature that distinguishes it
from already existing products. They appear in the debt (D), convertible debt (CD),
preferred (P) and convertible preferred (CP) classes.
These products have become increasingly important not only as a fertile ground
for innovation but also as a large source of funds. Between 1985 and 2002 rms raised
over 200 billion, which represents almost 16 of all the cash raised with common
stock in the same period by all the rms in the US economy. Table I shows that the
average issue raises almost 234 million (standard deviation, 299 million), which is
almost twice as large as the average issue using standard D, CD, P and CP in the
same period (average 130 million, standard deviation 152 million).
Underwriting fees are on average large, i.e., 2.41 (standard deviation 1.16 ),
relative to the contemporaneous underwriting fees of standard products (average
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1.14 , standard deviation 1.40 ). Unlike the case of SE s and IP s, underwriting
fees for equity-linked and corporate derivatives exhibit signicant variation.
<INSERT TABLE I AB UT HERE>
Panel B of Table I shows that 18 of the 50 securities have been imitated. ver
60 of all the issues recorded correspond to imitated securities. There is signicant
heterogeneity in the times to imitation, measured either as the number of issues or
days before the entry of the rst imitator. Despite being imitated early (after 2
median issues), innovators have on average the largest market share (0.57, standard
deviation 0.23).
lassi cation o cor orate inno ations
We classify all the securities following Schroth (2006).4 Table II shows this classi-
cation. The securities are listed in the order in which they historically appear. The
largest groups, in terms of the number of products, are the groups of convertible pre-
ferred equity and the group of tax-saving, income deferring securities. These groups
also exhibit signicant imitation activity. Innovations in standard debt products
(RISRS) or zero-coupon convertible debt (LY NS) brought about relatively large
and long lasting underwriting markets but do not seem to have provided a fertile
ground for subsequent development.
<INSERT TABLE II AB UT HERE>
artici atin un er riters
There are 98 bank-security pairs. It is clear from the list of participating banks that
innovation and imitation in corporate products of the equity-linked or derivative type
is a game between Wall Streets top banks. Most of them have vast underwriting
experience, large placement capabilities and good relationships with institutional
investors and frequent issuers. These characteristics are generally used in the in-
vestment banking literature to capture the heterogeneity across banks competing for
underwriting mandates of SE s and IP s. Given that this data is concentrated on
the top banks, we expect these characteristics to vary little across banks. We expect
other sources of heterogeneity across banks and securities matter more in this data
set.
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haracteristics o cor orate inno ations
An innovation is a new corporate security that a rm can issue to raise funds. The
innovator competes with imitators to underwrite new issues of each given new secu-
rity. To understand what may distinguish the innovator from its imitators, consider
the following examples.
E a les
re erre Equit e e tion u ulati e Stoc E S PERCS are
3-year mandatorily convertible preferred shares that pay a xed dividend. The con-
version rate is one but the conversion value is capped if the common shares appreciate
too much. Thus, each issue of PERCS species, among other things, the cap to the
common stock returns, r: The contract must also specify the dividends payable and
the o¤er price (see Figure 1).
<INSERT FIGURE 1 AB UT HERE>
n e tie a reciation notes Generic index-tied debt (ELKS, MITTS) will
specify the stock, or index of stocks, whose price is tied to the ad ustable face value
of the bond. The underwriter has to choose the underlying and the sensitivity of the
face value to the underlying for each issue.
Common to these examples is the fact that the underwriter must choose several
parameters for every issue within the product structure. These choices (e.g., the
PERCS conversion cap) typically vary across issues. The role of the underwriter
is not only to build the book but also to structure the issue, i.e., to customize it.
The structuring skills of underwriters could be a potentially important source of
di¤erentiation between innovators and imitators.
Issue customizing has been well documented and it is depicted in the testimonies
of bankers collected by Eccles and Crane (1988). In addition, Schroth (2006) analyzes
the structuring of equity-linked issues and nds a signicant variation across the
parameters within the same designs. In fact, Schroth (2006) nds much less variation
within the imitators set of issues. Hence, it seems that even if the imitator learns the
product design and competes with the innovator early, it lags in structuring skills.
More generally, the inherent characteristic of corporate innovations in these data
is that the product design does not immediately disclose all the product information
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known to the innovator. The skill di¤erential may show up in (i) the choice of the
issues parameters (e.g., oors, caps) within the security design (ii) the provision of
advice to issuers about the hedging of their liabilities 5 or (iii) the resolution of legal
or tax issues before the product can be issued6 .
ther prominent nancial vehicles not included in our sample share these features.
For example, Goldman, Sachs and Co. pioneered and remained the lead underwriter
of putable securities indexed to the Nikkei Index. The idea of issuing Nikkei Put
warrants was disclosed rapidly to competitors but Goldman also hedged the issuers
exposure to the Nikkei privately, proting from private information acquired during
the development of the hybrid security.
Sequential inno ation
Table II shows that innovation occur sequentially within a product group. Being in
the same group, these products have common design features but later generations
change or improve earlier designs. Consider the following example.
i i en Enhance on ertible Stoc E S DECS are also 3-year manda-
torily convertible preferred shares, but they converts to one common share only if
the stock appreciates more that r% or if it depreciates. therwise, they convert to
their xed current common value (Figure 2). DECS are a third generation product
derived from PERCS.7
<INSERT FIGURE 2 AB UT HERE>
Table III compares the main characteristics of issues of rst generations and later
generations. Three observations stand out. For rst generations, (i) issuers pay
signicantly lower underwriting fees (ii) entry is signicantly slower, measured as
the number of issues to imitation and (iii) the innovator has a signicantly larger
market share.
<INSERT TABLE III AB UT HERE>
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The facts that innovators of later generations have smaller market shares than
rst generation innovators and that entry speeds up for later generations suggest
that the generation number may be an important, previously overlooked source of
heterogeneity. In particular, it seems that the innovators advantage may decrease
with the securitys generation number. This result is consistent with the intuition
that, if the imitator needs to acquire specic skills to match the innovator, it is likely
that part of the skills learnt from underwriting early generations will still be useful
to underwrite late generation products. Therefore, the skill di¤erential between the
innovator and its imitators will be smaller and shorter lived for later generations.
Later generations may improve earlier designs and increase the choice of the
issuer as to what to issue. The average increase in underwriting fees from the rst
to the later generations are consistent with this interpretation. Whether generations
add value to the issuer at an increasing or decreasing rate along the sequence is an
empirical issue, testable with the multivariate analysis we propose in Section II.
E lient lo alt
The loyalty of clients is a prominent feature of the investment banking literature.
Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) argue corporate nance innovation is protable
because issuers are reluctant to break their relationships with their underwriter.
The underwriter exploits this loyalty by increasing the underwriting fee above the
competitive price without losing the underwriting mandate. We measure the relative
client loyalty at each issue t of security g by the propensity that the issuer, x; has
had in the past to choose bank b over its rivals b0 to underwrite g. The index is:
LOY ALt;g;b;x =
#(issues between x and b)P
8b0in market g
#(issues between x and b0)
 
1
#(b0 in market g)
; (1)
where #(issues between x and b) is the total number of past issues of any security
since 1985 with the same issuer-underwriter pair
P
8b0in market g
#(issues between x and
b0) is the sum of these counts for the same issuer over all banks that compete for
security g and #(b0 in market g) is the number of such banks.
The rst term of this coe cient measures how much more likely the issuing rm
was to choose this bank in the past over all the other underwriters of this security.
The second term normalizes for the fact that the number of competing underwriters
is heterogeneous across securities. A value of zero means that the issuer has chosen
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all of the competing banks with equal likelihood in the past. We also rene this
measure by counting only past issues of securities of the same class, i.e., D, CD, P,
or CP, instead of all issues.
<INSERT TABLE IV AB UT HERE>
We see in Table IV that, regardless of its denition, the loyalty index exhibits
very little variation: the inter-quartile range for both measures is zero. Moreover, the
univariate test shows no signicant di¤erence between the average of either measure
of loyalty to innovators or imitators (p-values of 0.46 and 0.13). Further, loyalty
covaries little with whether the underwriter is the innovator or not (correlation of
0.05 and 0.09). Thus, it seems that loyalty will have a small impact on the dynamics
of market shares and equilibrium underwriting fees when tested formally.
An e irical o el o the un er ritin ar et
To analyze our data, consider the following stylized model of the underwriting market
for corporate innovations. The issuer has to choose and underwriter, and the services
of competing banks (innovator and imitators) are di¤erentiated.
A he un er ritin ar et
Let t = 0 denote the rst issue of a new security, g: By denition, this security is
underwritten by the innovator, b = 0: The design of g is immediately revealed to
the imitating bank, b = 1 (the case with more than one imitator is developed in
the Appendix and produces the same qualitative results). Let t = 1; 2; ::: denote the
observed sequence of issues. We assume that one nancing rm is drawn at each
t and that each cannot delay the issue. Both underwriters bid for the mandate to
structure and sell the security and compete in fees, pb (i.e., the underwriting spread),
to get the mandate.
he un er ritin ser ice
The underwriting service provided by banks is di¤erentiated both vertically and
horizontally. The vertical dimension measures the quality of the product and the
underwriting service, qb: all other things being equal, an issuing rm prefers an
underwriter who knows how to customize better the issue.
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Let the quality di¤erential q q0   q1: Whenever the innovator has a superior
expertise, then q > 0: To explore the superior expertise hypothesis, we let the
quality di¤erential depend on the number of issues and the generation number of
the security and write it as q (t; g) : The innovators initial advantage is therefore
q (0; g) : If the imitator catches up with the innovators underwriting skill as more
issues occur, then q (t; g) is decreasing in t for a given g: Further, if our previous
intuition is correct and the skills learnt from underwriting early generations are useful
to catch up faster with the innovator in later ones, then q (0; g) is decreasing in g
and q (t; g) > q (t; g0) for all g0 > g:
The horizontal dimension represents the preferences of issuing rms for a partic-
ular bank. Issuers are located on a unit interval and their unit mass is uniformly
distributed over it (we relax this assumption in the Section V). The two competing
investment banks are located at the extremes, so that a rm x [0; 1] is partial to
one bank. Hence, the preferences of a rm at x for either bank are given by
v0(x; g; t) = q0 (t; g)  p0   sx;
v1(x; g; t) = q1 (t; g)  p1   s(1  x);
where s measures the intensity (unit cost) of loyalty. With this setup each bank has
its own clientele of nancing rms. The distance to either represents the degree of
loyalty to both.
The drawn rm chooses its underwriter, b; to maximize vb and has a reservation
value normalized to zero, i.e., she cannot delay the nancing. Each banks prots
per issue are
b (pb   c)Db(x; p0; p1; g; s; t) for b = 0; 1; (2)
and where c represents the marginal cost of underwriting an issue (e.g., SEC ling,
advertising, legal fees) and t the issue number.
estable i lications o the equilibriu
The main sources of testable comparative statics in this model are s and q: All
proofs to the propositions that follow are in the appendix.
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Equilibriu entr ti e
Let x^ be the issuer that is indi¤erent between both banks that set a fee at marginal
cost. That is, x^ solves








Whenever the innovators expertise advantage is high relative to the intensity of
loyalty of its clients, i.e., q (t; g) > s, then x^ > 1 so that even the most loyal client
to the imitator chooses the innovator in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the innovator
chooses a fee that guarantees him the mandate for any issuer x [0; x); where
x min (1; x^) : Similarly, the imitator gets mandates from issuers that are relatively
loyal, i.e., for x (x; 1]: The probability that an innovator gets the mandate is
therefore Pr(x x); and Figure 3 illustrates both banks mandate probabilities as
a function of q:
<INSERT FIGURE 3 AB UT HERE>
If q(t; g) decreases with t for a given g; then the probability that the imita-
tor gets the next mandate is zero until q(t; g) becomes smaller than s. For any
issue that follows, entry is a positive probability event and increasingly likely. The
probability distribution of entry is characterized by the next proposition.
ro osition The probability distribution of the time of entry by the imitator at
the N-th issue of security g is rst order stochastically dominated by the distribution
of the time of entry of security g0 if and only if q (g; t) < q (g0; t).
This result implies that imitation occurs, on average, sooner for smaller q (0; g).
ur hypothesis that q (0; g) is decreasing in g implies that later generations are
imitated faster.
This analysis has also implications about the speed and timing at which secu-
rity innovations are introduced into the market. An innovator will choose not to
underwrite immediately an issue of a new security if none of its close clients needs
nance at that time. Indeed, underwriting an issue of a rm outside its usual, loyal,
clientele is not as protable for the bank because of the outsiders larger switching
costs to bear. Hence, the innovator will delay the trigger of the imitators learning
process until it can make larger prots from the rst. The innovator will either wait
or aggressively market the product to its loyal clients with the aim of securing a more
protable underwriting contract and the highest continuation prots.
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Equilibriu un er ritin ees
For any x [0; x); the innovators equilibrium fee is obtained from the indi¤erence
condition
q0 (t; g)  p

0   sx = q1 (t; g)  c  s(1  x);
p0 (t; g; s; x; c) = c+ (1  2x)s+q (t; g) : (3)
For any x (x; 1]; the imitators underwriting fee is
p1 (t; g; s; x; c) = c+ (2x  1)s q (t; g) : (4)
It is clear from (3) and (4) that, given c; x and s; the di¤erence between the under-
writing fee charged by the innovator and imitator follows the behavior of q (t; g) :
Therefore, controlling for marginal costs of underwriting and for the intensity of loy-
alty, using (1) ; the equilibrium fee of the innovator is larger than that of the imitator,
but the di¤erence converges to zero in t if and only if q (t; g) converges to zero in
t for a given g:
Another testable implication of the superior expertise hypothesis is that the speed
of convergence is increasing in q (0; g) : The initial advantage, q (0; g; 0) ; is iden-
tied by (3) and (4) through the comparison of innovators and imitators fees across
g at t = 0: Further, the speed of fee convergence is identied from the comparison of
fees across issues within the same generation and underwriter.
iscussion
The model above fully exploits the data by comparing the equilibrium fees, market
shares, and the entry times of innovators and imitators over the life cycle of a secu-
rity and across di¤erent securities ordered by their generation number. The model
identies the predictions of the superior expertise hypothesis from those of the client
loyalty hypothesis by conditioning the issue outcomes on the timing of it, i.e., the
issues number and the securitys generation number.
Note that client loyalty here plays an identical role as in Bhattacharyya and
Nanda (2000). However, the loyalty hypothesis on its own, i.e., if q (g; t) = 0,
would predict that imitation is immediate and that the fees and expected market
shares di¤erences between the innovator and its imitators are stationary.
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This model takes the cost of switching as given and rules out the possibility that
loyalty increases during the life cycle of the product. This assumption is borne by
the data: no rm issues the same security more than once. The e¤ects of increased
loyalty on future innovations are discussed in Section V.
E i ence ro the ti in o i itation
Proposition 1 implies that market entry by imitators occurs sooner on average for
later generation products than for earlier generations if later generations increase
the value to the issuer with respect to previous ones at a decreasing rate. Table III
showed that late generations are indeed imitated faster than the rst ones. Figure 4
takes a closer look by plotting the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the speed at which a security is imitated.
<INSERT FIGURE 4 AB UT HERE>
The dotted line is the CDF of the number of issues before imitation for all rst
generation imitated securities in our data. The solid line is the CDF of the number
of issues before imitation for all imitated later generation products. As predicted,
the imitation time CDF of later generations rst-order stochastically dominates the
imitation time CDF of rst generations.
A he ha ar rate o i itation
For a precise test, we estimate a model of the survival time, i.e., the issue count,
before a security is imitated. We take every issue of every imitated security before
imitation and pair the issue number of each with the relevant covariates. With this
data we estimate the parameters of
g;t = exp (0 + 1g + 2xg;t + ") ; (5)
where g;t is the probability that security g is imitated immediately after issue t
given that it has not yet been imitated. We use xgt to capture characteristics of the
market for security g that may speed up or slow down imitation. We use the total
size of the market and the total number of issues ever. We also use the size of the
rst issue and the average size of all issues before t to approximate the imitators
expectations of the market size. We estimate 0; 1; and 2 by maximum likelihood,
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using standard errors estimators that are robustly consistent to heteroskedasticity
and correlation within securities in the same group.
We assume that " is log-normally distributed so that   lng is the conditional
mean of the distribution of the log of the imitation time for security g: The log-normal
assumption implies that the baseline hazard rate is initially zero and increasing,
implying that, ceteris paribus, it is initially very hard for a competitor to imitate
a new security yet as time passes it becomes easier. We omit our results for other
distributional assumptions, but they are available in a supplement to the paper.
As expected, the results are virtually identical when we use distributions of the
generalized F class. These distributions imply an increasing baseline hazard rate
and thus all the estimates and the goodness of t measures are basically the same as
in the log-normal case.8
esults
The rst column in Panel A of Table V shows the benchmark estimates of the para-
meters in (5). As predicted, a higher generation index is associated, on average, with
a larger hazard rate and thus, with a faster expected imitation time. The estimate
is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 95 level. The oint hypotheses that all
parameters are zero is also re ected. All the other columns show the results when
we use di¤erent security-specic controls. The estimate of 1 is steady, negative and
signicantly di¤erent from zero with at least 95 condence in all cases.
<INSERT TABLE V AB UT HERE>
ur estimates of 1 are also economically signicant. Panel A of Table VI shows
the estimated median times of the entry of imitators, 1
b
; for di¤erent product gen-
erations. We calculate these estimates at all the quartiles and at the mean of the
sample distribution of the control variables using the estimates in column 5. The
predicted median imitation time of a rst generation security is almost four issues.
The median imitation time is reduced by one issue on average for fth generations
and to 1.5 for 15th generations.
<INSERT TABLE VI AB UT HERE>
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The estimates of 2 are positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero to the 99
level when we use the total volume issued ever and the total number of issues ever
(columns 2 and 3). Thus, imitation is slower on average for securities with bigger
markets. ur interpretation for this result is that, as we argued before, the innovator
has incentives to market aggressively the innovation to its close clientele, securing
enough issues early before imitation e¤ectively limits its market power. These incen-
tives will be stronger for larger markets.
Approximating market size with ex-post measures has revealed more about the
innovators incentives to slow down imitation, conditional on g: To understand better
the imitators reaction, we use ex-ante measures of the market size, i.e., information
about the market size available to the imitator as the market unfolds. The coe cients
of the size of the rst issue and the average size of all issues before t are either small or
insignicant (columns 4 and 5). In column 6 we augment the specication to include
also the standard deviation of the issue size before t: The coe cient is positive and
signicant with 95 condence. Hence, the imitators uncertainty about the market
size is what drives his entry time over and above the generation number. More
uncertainty delays the imitators entry.
alen ar ti e to i itation
We redo the hazard rate analysis of the model in (5) using the calendar times (days)
after innovation instead of the issue numbers (t). The imitators e¤orts to enter the
market would not be well captured by deal counts if some of the rst few issuers
had been already captive clients of the innovator. Panel B of Table V shows the
parameter estimates and Panel B of Table VI shows their implied imitation speeds.
We conrm that the speed of imitation increases in g regardless of the speed
measure (issues or days): the estimates of 1 are positive and signicantly di¤erent
from 0 with 99 or 95 condence in all six columns. But the predictive roles of
ex-ante and ex-post measures of market size have reversed. Ex-post measures have
no e¤ect on the hazard rate of imitation (columns 2 and 3) whereas ex-ante measures
now have a negative and signicant e¤ect. Larger pre-imitation issues on average
accelerate imitation in terms of days but not in terms of issue counts. ur initial
interpretation is therefore strengthened. The larger the expected market size, the
faster imitators will try to enter the market. They will achieve this goal in terms of
calendar time but not in terms of the number of issues because the innovator will
also move fast to secure initial mandates.
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Figure 5 illustrates the survival probabilities (i.e., the probability that a security
has not been imitated within a certain time) implied by the estimates above.
<INSERT FIGURE 5 AB UT HERE>
Su ar
We have shown in this section that the main driver of imitation speeds is the se-
curitys generation number. This speed is increasing in g: This e¤ect is robust to
the measurement of the speed of imitation: the issue count or the number of days.
n top of that e¤ect, innovators slow down the entry of imitators by securing more
underwriting mandates in larger markets. Imitators speed up their entry in markets
they expect to be larger with less uncertainty.
E i ence ro un er ritin ees
From (3) and (4) ; we learn that the di¤erence between the underwriting fees of inno-
vators and imitators, over and above bank-specic and issuer-specic characteristics,
depends on the securitys generation number, g, and the issue number within the
security, t: We hypothesize that the innovators fee is higher than the imitators but
the di¤erence decreases in the issue number. The di¤erence decreases faster the later
the generation number of the security if and only if the innovators initial advantage
decreases with g:
A he econo etric s eci cation
We model the underwriting fee of issue t of security g as





where 1INNb+2tg measuresq(t; g): INNb takes value 1 if the underwriter of
issue t is the securitys innovator and  1 otherwise. The initial expertise advantage
of the innovator for generation g is 2 (1 + 2g) : A rst test of the superior expertise
hypothesis is that 1 + 2g > 0 for every g in the sample.
The initial expertise advantage, q(0; g); is decreasing with the generation num-
ber if and only if 2 < 0: If 2 < 0 then the advantage decreases at a rate of  22g
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per issue, i.e., faster for later generations. The implied issue number after which
q(t; g) = 0 is given by   1
2g
:
LOY ALt;g;b;x is dened in equation (1). It measures the past likelihood of the
issuer to choose underwriter b by the time of issue t of security g: Thus, it measures
x: The parameter  measures s and is interpreted as the importance of client loyalty
for this segment of the underwriting market. For robustness, we reconstruct this
measure counting: (i) only issues one year before t and (ii) only issues of the same
class, i.e., debt, convertible debt, preferred, or convertible preferred.
The vector wt includes issue-specic controls to allow the underwriting fees to
vary according to the marginal cost of underwriting an issue. We include the size
of the issue (logarithm of the proceeds), and the securitys maturity for issues of
debt and convertible debt. We also include a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the issuers debt is of investment grade. All specications also include bank-specic
characteristics through zb;t to capture the fee variation due to di¤erences in the
reputation of the underwriter for placing an issue successfully. We use the banks
historical underwriting volume market shares for security g at t; and for all securities
in the same class, l = D;CD;P;CP as g:
We allow for further class-specic pricing di¤erences trough l:We estimate l as
a random or a xed e¤ect, and all the other parameters, ;; w and z; accordingly.
We include yearly specic dummies between 1986 and 2003 wherever noted. Finally,
g;t is the error term due to residual unobserved heterogeneity.
The specication above follows the empirical literature on underwriting fees (see
Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000): it includes the issue size to capture economies of scale
and issue and bank-specic measures to capture the increasing part of the marginal
costs curve. It also includes bank-specic measures that capture the banks generic
underwriting service quality on top of the quality specic to the innovation. The
new element in the specication above is that the comparisons of the underwriting
fees are made across issues for a given security and across generations for given is-
sue numbers. Tufanos (1989) failure to identify di¤erences between innovators and
imitators fees may have easily been caused by not making these two comparisons.
Note too that our model relates the fees levels to quality di¤erences between inno-
vators and imitators and not to the quality levels. This is an important implication
for the identication of superior expertise hypothesis in the sense that the e¤ects of
bank-specic characteristics in zb;t account for pricing di¤erences over and above the
advantage intrinsic to the innovator, q (t; g).
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esults an inter retation
Table VII shows the estimates of the parameters of (6): Columns 1 through 3 estimate
the model using all issues of all imitated securities in the data. Columns 4 through 6
exclude the rst issue of each security (18 observations). If the fee for the rst issue
was e¤ectively set before imitators had any knowledge of the new security structure,
then it would have been set by a monopolist rather than by a leading oligopolist.
We compute a random and a xed e¤ects estimator for all six specications and
report the former. Columns 2,3,5 and 6 include year dummies and based on the
Hausman test we cannot re ect that l is uncorrelated with j: Thus, the inclusion
of year dummies improves the specication and renders the random e¤ects estimator
consistent and e cient.
In consistency with the superior expertise hypothesis, the estimates of 1 are
positive for all specications. The condence level increases from 90 (columns 2 and
3) to at least 95 (columns 5 and 6) after excluding the rst issues of all securities.
Recall that the average underwriting fee for imitated securities is 2.33 . Hence, the
implied average excess equilibrium fee of innovators with respect to imitators, that
is, ^1
2:33
; ranges between 8.9 and 16.5 . Columns 5 and 6 also show higher R2s and
lower Hausman statistics than 2 and 3. As we expected, the specication in (6) ts
much better the sample that excludes the rst issue. The estimate of 2 is always
negative and di¤erent from zero with 99 condence across all specications. This
result shows that each innovation adds less value on average than its predecessor. The
innovators expertise advantage decreases as more issues are completed and decreases
faster for later generation products. Note too how stable these estimates are across
all specications with year dummies.
<INSERT TABLE VII AB UT HERE>
We can never re ect that  is di¤erent from zero for all specications in Table
VII. We obtain this result regardless of how we measure loyalty, i.e., either using the
counts of underwriter-issuer pairs for all securities or only for securities in the same
class l as g: This result is driven by the fact that issuers of corporate derivatives are
frequent issuers of securities in general and keep relationships with all the top banks.
The typical issuer seems impartial to all competitors. This fact leaves little room
for the loyal clientele hypothesis, and the variation in underwriting fees is e¤ectively
explained by the inter-generational and inter-issue comparisons.
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The coe cient of the logarithm of proceeds is negative and seems to capture the
economies of scale in an o¤ering. It is signicant with 90 condence for columns 4
and 5, where the t of the model in general is the best. The variation in maturity and
investment grade dont seem to capture the fees variation as well as the bank-specic
variables. The fact that the coe cient for the banks volume share of corporate
derivatives underwriting is negative suggests that it is capturing the banks lower
underwriting cost. Recall that levels of bank-specic variables in this model explain
fees levels through the marginal costs of underwriting or the underwriting quality
in general (not security-specic). Thus, the banks success as an underwriter of
any security, measured by the banks volume share in the class, has a positive and
signicant coe cient and, therefore, captures the banks underwriting quality level
in general.
Table VIII interprets the estimates shown above and analyzes their economic
signicance. The number of issues before the innovators expertise advantage disap-
pears is   ^1
^2g
: It takes at least 10 issues for the imitator to compete at equal strength
with the innovator in the underwriting market for rst generation products. For 15th
generation products, the innovator faces the toughest competition immediately after
it has innovated. Note that this is another consistency check of our model: the initial
innovators advantage, 1 + 2g > 0 is positive for every generation number in our
sample (g 15): It is never the case that the imitator starts with a lead. This is
strong evidence that our econometric specication e¤ectively identies advantages
intrinsic to innovation and not to other bank characteristics (e.g., reputation).
<INSERT TABLE VIII AB UT HERE>
obustness
Allo in or ono olistic ees
The pricing model ts better the sample of issues after the monopolist issue. ur
interpretation was that monopolist issues are priced di¤erently. In fact, the fee set
by the innovator before the security design is disclosed to the imitator is p0 = q0 sx:
Hence, the monopolist fee is independent of the marginal cost of underwriting and
the innovators advantage over the imitator. It depends on the loyalty of the client
and the level of the innovators underwriting quality. Therefore, we use the full
sample of issues to estimate
pt;g = 0 + LOY ALt;g;b;x + 
0
zzb;t + l




where Ift>1g = 1 for all issues after the rst, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 through
3 of Table I show the results.
<INSERT TABLE I AB UT HERE>
The R2s are very similar to those where we excluded the 18 monopolist issues.
However, we gain a lot of precision in the estimation of 1 and 2: In particular, 1
is now signicant at least with 95 condence. The estimates are close to the pre-
vious ones. Therefore, the generation number and the issue number have signicant
economic e¤ects on the speed of convergence of the imitators expertise with that of
the innovator. The implied speeds of convergence are very similar to those reported
in Table VIII and we do not report them here. They are available upon request.
Note that the underwriters historical volume share in the class is not interacted
with the oligopoly dummy Ift>1g and it still has a signicant and positive e¤ect on the
underwriting fee. n the other hand, the banks volume share of only equity-linked
and derivatives does interact with the oligopoly dummy and preserves the expected
negative sign. These results strengthens our earlier conclusion that the volume share
in the class a¤ects the fees through the banks underwriting quality level and the
volume share of only recent innovations captures the marginal cost heterogeneity
across banks.
ost i itation ees
So far we have estimated the model as if the imitator exerted a competitive pressure
over the underwriting fee either since the rst issue or since the second. It is impossi-
ble to know for sure since when exactly this pressure was e¤ective. We do know that
every issue since the imitators rst one occurs in an oligopoly and not a monopoly.
Hence, we estimate the model restricting the sample to the 207 post-imitation issues.
As the selection of post-imitation issues may introduce a bias, we estimate the
model








where  (t;0xg) is the inverse mills ratio derived from the hazard rate model of the
time to imitation in (5) :9 Therefore,  (t;0xg) =  
( 1^ (ln t ^
0
xg))
( 1^ (ln t ^
0
xg))
and ^ and ^ are
the estimates shown in column 4 of Table V.
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Columns 3 through 5 show the estimates with this correction. ualitatively, the
results are identical as those in Table VII. The R2s have increased, and the loyalty
measure has now a positive and signicant coe cient to the 95 level (column 3).
The estimates of 1 and 2 change little with this correction and our inference and
conclusions remain unchanged.
Su ar
We have shown in this section that the observed underwriting fees t very well the
oligopoly model where innovators and imitators compete to get the next underwrit-
ing mandate. The comparison of the fees across issues within a generation and across
generations for given issue numbers identies the dynamic pattern of the innovators
quality advantage over its imitators: the innovator starts with an initial leadership
that it uses to mark-up its issues while securing the mandate. This leadership de-
creases at a speed that is increasing in the generation number. The e¤ects of this
expertise advantage over the fees are of the rst order, whereas the measures of client
loyalty appear to have little or no predictive power.
urther e i ence an e tensions
Below we present additional evidence found in our data and discuss some extensions
to the model.
A ar et shares
The next proposition characterizes the expected equilibrium market shares for the
innovator and the imitator after any arbitrary number of issues of a security g using
the equilibrium prices and the mandate probabilities for every (g; t) :
ro osition The innovators market share leadership over the imitator decreases
with the number of issues within a security, ceteris paribus. The speed of market
share convergence in the underwriting market for security g is larger than that for
security g0 if and only if q (t; g) < q (t; g0) :
The superior expertise hypothesis predicts that the demand for the innovators
underwriting services and its equilibrium market share are overall larger than the
imitators but that this di¤erence decreases with time. Tufano (1989) nds the
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innovators of corporate securities between 1971 and 1989 have the largest overall
underwriting market share. Panel B of Table III shows the same result for innova-
tors of all imitated equity-linked and corporate derivatives. It also shows that the
innovators leadership is bigger for rst generation securities.10
The model predicts that the less value added by an innovation the smaller the
demand and the market share advantage and the shorter the expected duration of
this leadership. ur evidence from underwriting fees shows that the value added per
innovation is decreasing in the innovations generation number. Therefore, the evi-
dence found by Schroth (2006) is a direct test of our model: he estimates the demand
for the innovators and imitators varieties of equity-linked and derivative corporate
products over time and conrms that, on average, the market demand for the inno-
vators product is greater than that for the imitators in an arbitrary time period.
This study also nds that the di¤erence between the demand for the innovators and
the imitators underwriting services converge faster for later generations.
he len th o ro uct li e
Later generations typically improve and replace previous ones. Thus, the actual
life span of a security depends on the speed at which a later generation product is
developed. To understand this relationship, consider this simple extension. Let each
innovation have a nite life of random duration. Let the probability that this security
design is not replaced by a new one in the next period be (1   ): For parsimony,
we abstract from time discounting. Indeed, the timing of this game re ects issues
intervals rather than chronological intervals.11
After every issue of any given security, the innovator or the imitator may develop
a new product in the group with probabilities 0 and 1; respectively. The probability
that some bank innovates after t issues is
1  (1  0)(1  1) :
The expected number of issues before a given generation is replaced by the next
equals 1

:12 If the innovator uses his current expertise advantage also to develop next
generations, then 0 > 1: The closer is 1 to 0; the higher is  and the shorter is
the life of the current generation. Thus, later generation products will be replaced
faster by the next ones if 1   0 is decreasing in g: Panel B of Table III shows the
observed number of issues per security. Later generations are shorter lived than the
rst.
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hich ro ucts are i itate
The shorter the life of a security, the lower the probability that it will be imitated.
Later generation products are imitated faster conditional on being imitated. But due
to their shorter life expectancy, we would expect less imitation later in a product
sequence.
There are 18 of the 50 innovations in this sample that are imitated. Table shows
the distributions of imitated and non-imitated products conditional on whether these
are rst or later generation products. First generation products are signicantly
more likely to be imitated than later generation products: we can re ect the null
hypothesis of no association between the imitation and the generation number with
95 condence. ne explanation is that as later generation products are shorter
lived, it is less likely that an imitator will underwrite an issue of such a product.
This is even the case if it takes, on average, fewer issues by the innovator for the
imitator to enter the market.
<INSERT TABLE AB UT HERE>
he ro ts ro inno ation
The expected prots for the innovator before issue t = 0 are










as the speed at which the imitators expertise converges to the
innovators. The incentives to innovate and imitate are characterized by the following
proposition.
ro osition The innovators total prots and the incentives to innovate increase
with the innovators initial expertise advantage q (g; 0) and decrease with

q(g).
The imitators total prots decrease with q (g; t) and increase with

q(g):
In this model, the innovator has an incentive to innovate in markets where imita-
tors can extract less information from an issue, i.e., where

q(g) is low. This will be
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the case in highly volatile markets where changes in the economic environment may
induce more variation in the structuring parameters across issues. Thus, innovation
may occur more frequently in volatile markets not because issuing rms demand new
securities that hedge increased risk but because in such markets banks would expect
bigger and longer lived advantages as innovators.
E o inno ators al a s ersist
We assumed that issuers were symmetrically distributed on the unit interval accord-
ing to their loyalty to either competing underwriter. No bank had an advantage over
the other before innovating. We now explore the dynamics of the innovators exper-
tise advantage when the innovator and the imitators have clienteles of di¤erent sizes.
To model this simply, we assume that clients are distributed on the unit interval
according to a beta density function
f (x) = x
 1 0 x 1;
which is parametrized by  > 0: For  < 1 the initial client base advantage goes to
the innovator and for  > 1 it goes to the imitator. When  = 1 we have the uniform








what changes is the mass of clients located on both sides of x:
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ro osition The larger the initial clientele of a bank, the greater the prots from
each issue regardless of whether the bank is the product innovator or imitator.
We learn from this result that the initial client base can have an important e¤ect
on the incentives to innovate. Ceteris paribus, it may not be protable for a bank
with a smaller initial client base to develop a new product that will later be imitated,
whereas it may be protable for a bank with a larger initial client base to do so. As
a result, banks with larger client bases should innovate more often.
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The above argument brings us to the relation between innovation and reputation.
It is often argued that in the nancial sector there are returns for being a leader
rather than a follower. Many rms prefer to be clients of a bank that innovates
more frequently than of one that does not innovate or does not innovate frequently.
This e¤ect can be captured in our model if we assume that every product innovation
makes  decrease. If the potential developer of a new product can expand its client
base, i.e., gain additional clients for its more traditional services as a result of an
enhanced reputation, then it has an additional incentive to develop new products
as in the future higher prots can be expected from a larger client base. Morgan
Stanleys dominance in convertible preferred stock in the early and mid nineties is a
notable example consistent with this prediction.
Taking the argument further, if switching costs or client loyalty were the main
source of prots for an innovator, then we would expect the same banks to innovate
very frequently along the product sequence and others to be persistently relegated
to the role of imitators. n the contrary, Table shows that a signicant share
of the later generation products are innovated by banks that did not develop the
rst generation product. f the 39 innovations that appear after the rst generation
product, 33 were innovated by banks that did not develop the rst generation prod-
uct. Moreover, we have seen empirically that bank-specic reputation measures do
a¤ect positively the banks fees but that the e¤ect of being innovator has a strong
e¤ect over and above reputation.
or orate eri ati es an co ana e un er ritin
We nd one more explanation in the literature of why patents are not necessary for
corporate nance innovation. Nanda and Yun (1995) argue that banks coordinate
their R D e¤ort as a oint venture to overcome the free-riding problem. We believe,
however, that this hypothesis does not apply to our data and the types of securities
described in this paper. Firstly, our data set and that used by Nanda and Yun have
only one security in common. Secondly, of the 665 underwriting contracts for equity-
linked and derivative corporate securities only 13 were ointly underwritten by two
or more lead underwriters. In fact, the underwriting role was only shared once in
the rst issue of a security.
27
onclusion
ur new evidence on the speed of entry of imitators into the market and the equi-
librium underwriting fees for recent corporate product innovations reveals important
dynamics that match the predictions of the superior expertise hypothesis and rule
out other explanations.
The expertise advantage of the innovator makes it more likely that it will recoup
the R D costs obtaining a positive prot from the innovation even without patent
protection. The ruling in State Street Bank vs. Signature Financial Group in 1999,
where the US Supreme Court upheld a patent for a nancial business method, has
caused a well-documented run on patents (Lerner, 2000). Whether patent and copy-
right protection is a good idea in general remains a controversial question among
economists today.13 ur results suggest that State Street may have unnecessarily in-
creased the incentives for innovation at the cost of increased litigation and defensive
patenting by investment banks. The net e¤ect on the amount of innovation and its
protability for investment banks remain to be seen and studied.
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A en i roo s
roo o ro osition The probability distribution that the imitator gets its
rst underwriting mandate at the N th issue is
Pr(N) = 1  N 1t=1 (xt) ;











Clearly, Pr(N) decreases in q (t; g) for every N:
roo o ro osition The expected market share of the innovator after M
issues (including t = 0) is
MS0 (M) =
 










= (M + 1)












= (M + 1) ;
The expected market share of the innovator is always larger than the expected market
share of the imitator as long as q (t; g) > 0 but the di¤erence is









= (M + 1) ;
which is clearly decreasing in t if q (t; g) is decreasing in t: Since q (t; g) s for
t N; then the innovators market share is larger than the imitators for any M .
This happens for two reasons. First, the possible entry of the imitator is delayed.
Second, even after entry, the probability that the imitator obtains the underwriting
mandate is still smaller. Finally, it is clear that MS0 (M)  MS1 (M) converges to
zero if and only if q (t; g) does.
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roo o ro osition Let N be the rst issue that the imitator can underwrite
with positive probability. N solves
q (N   1; g) > s > q (N; g) :
For a non-increasing speed

q (g) ; N is increasing in q(g; 0); decreasing in s; and
decreasing in





(p0   c)dx = x ((1  x)s+q (t; g)) =
(












(p1   c)dx = (1  x) (xs+q (t; g)) =
(







for q (t; g) < s:
The total expected prots from innovation are























The total expected prots from imitation account for the expected prots from














Therefore, the imitators total prots decrease with its initial quality disadvantage
q(0; g) and increase with

q(g).
roo o ro osition Clearly, the innovators prots per issue are decreasing


















A en i ore i itators
Consider the case of one innovator (b = 0) and two imitators (b = 1; 2) that are
located at the extremes of an equilateral triangle (Figure A2.1). The extension to










Figure A2. 1: Spatial representation of the is-
suers preferences for three competing banks.
Since the two imitators have the same expertise, the imitator farthest from the
issuer never obtains the underwriting mandate. Let b = 1 be, without loss of gener-
ality, the closest imitator. The values to the issuer located at x = (x; l) of choosing
either underwriter are
v0(x) = q0   p0   sd (x; 0) ;
v1(x) = q1   p1   sd (x; 1) ;
where d is the euclidean distance. Thus, d (x; 0) = x2 + l2 and d (x; 1) =
q
(1  x)2 + l2:













is dened implicitly byq
x^2 + l^2  
q


















ferent clients are those equidistant byq
s
to the two e¤ective competitors, located at
(0; 0) and (1; 0) :
The value of x^ that preserves the equality (7) is increasing in q for any l:Hence,
a higher expertise advantage of the innovator implies a larger clientele and a higher
probability that the innovator will underwrite the next issue. Therefore, all the
comparative statics of the two competitors model hold for any number of competitors
because any banks region of in uence, i.e., its clientele, is increasing with its relative
advantage (disadvantage), q ( q) :
Figure A2.2 below illustrates these comparative statics. Without any expertise
advantage (q = 0) we have x^ = 1
2
for l = 0: The three banks have the same market
share equal to 1
3







l = 0 and the innovator has the largest market share (solid lines). If the innovators
expertise advantage is high enough, i.e. q
s
> 1, then the indi¤erent client curve










Figure A2. 2: Banks clientels with and with-
out the innovators expertise advantage.
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1. Patents for nancial innovations have become e¤ective since the US Supreme Court
for the rst time validated a patent on a business method in 1999. See Lerner
(2002) for the e¤ects of State Street vs. Signature Financial Group on nancial
patents, and Ja¤ee and Lerner (2004) for a comprehensive discussion of the pros and
cons.
2. The total issued volume of equity-linked and derivative securities represents a very
large share of the total volume underwritten by the participating banks. The average
volume issued per underwriter of equity-linked and derivative securities between 1990
and 1999 was larger than the average issued volume of convertible preferred stock
(e.g., 1.2 times larger between 1995 and 1999) and convertible debt (e.g., 1.1 times
larger between 1995 and 1999), and about half of the issued volume of preferred
stock. See Tufano (1995) and Finnerty (1992) for a general overview of innovation
in corporate nance products. A more comprehensive survey of nancial innovation
is provided by Allen and Gale (1994).
3. The view that imitations are imperfect substitutes is summarized by the testimony
of William Toy, a Managing Director at CDC Capital:
There is at least a perception that the rst mover is more familiar with the product
he issues than the imitator (personal interview, New York City, February 2001).
4. Innovative corporate products are classied by Schroth (2006) using securities de-
scriptions from the Investment Dealers Digest, American Banker and the Dow Jones
Newswires. These sources provide at least one description of every product and a
reference to a similar older product.
5. The underwriter may sometimes buy part of the issue, in which case it needs to
understand the products e¤ect on the risk and returns of its portfolio. The case of
the Nikkei Put Warrants introduced by Goldman, Sachs & Co. in 1990 illustrates
this factor very well.
6. Goldman Sachs & Co. created MIPS and dominated their underwriting market
mostly thanks to the research it conducted on Grand Caymans corporate tax law.
MIPS were vehicles to issue preferred stock through a Cayman-based subsidiary that
would loan the entire proceeds to the already levered parent.
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7. Subsequent generations of convertible preferred stock are ACES and PEPS. ACES
convert one to one after 4 years with oors and caps. PEPS convert one to one after
4 years only if the common stock appreciates more than a threshold return.
8. Log-normality is more appealing theoretically and empirically over alternatives out-
side the F-class. The implied baseline hazard rate of other commonly used distribu-
tions, i.e., Exponential and Weibull, is time-invariant or decreasing, respectively, im-
plying counter-intuitively that imitation becomes harder with time. Not surprisingly,
the t under these assumptions is poor, whereas the t is good for all distributions
of the generalized F class.
9. This equation is derived from the mean of the underwriting fee, conditional on the
fact that the security has already been imitated. Thus, ifN is the (random) imitation
time, where lnN N(^
0
xg; ^); then the true models residual is
E
 





















for  (:) =   (:)
(:)
:
10. This is the share of the number of issues, as in Tufano (1989) and Schroth (2006),
and not the share of the underwritten principal. The implicit assumption is that the
amount of funds sought by the issuer is known by the time it chooses an underwriter.
11. Time discounting can be easily incorporated to the model if we let (1   ) be the
product of the probability of continuation and the pure time discount.
12. We can also let 0 and 1 increase with every issue. This would speed up the
introduction of later generations even more.
13. The most prominent recent cases against patent or copyright protection are made
by Ja¤ee and Lerner (2004) and by Boldrin and Levine (2006).
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Table I: Summary of all issues of equity-linked and dorporate derivative
securities
This table presents summary statistics for all issues of equity-linked and
corporate derivative securities. All such issues are recorded by the SDC and
span the period between 1985 and 2004. The imitated securities (Panel B)
are those that have been underwritten by more that one bank.
Panel A: All issues of all equity-linked and corporate derivatives (sample A)
Number of Median Mean Standard
observations deviation
Proceeds per issue 661 150:00 233:89 299:44
(  millions)
Underwriting fee 518 3:00 2:41 1:16
(percentage of proceeds)
Product life 50 5:50 13:24 20:60
(total issues per security)
Panel B: All issues of imitated securities (sample B)
Number of Median Mean Standard
observations deviation
Proceeds per issue (  millions) 410 150:00 257:24 344:74
(t statisitc for H0 : A   B = 0) ( 1:17)
Underwriting fee (percentage) 314 3:10 2:33 1:10
(t statisitc for H0 : A   B = 0) ( 0:98)
Product life 18 13:00 22:78 28:88
(t statisitc for H0 : A   B = 0) ( 1:15)
Time to imitation
(issues before imitation) 18 2:00 2:67 1:88
(days before imitation) 18 214:50 484:44 642:87
Market share of 18 0:53 0:57 0:23
product innovator
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signicance levels, respectively.
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Table II: Classication of equity-linked and corporate derivatives into product groups
This table shows the classication of all 50 equity-linked and corporate derivative securities into product groups.
We follow the classication proposed by Schroth (2006) which is based on the structure and purpose of the security.
Securities within groups are listed in the order of their appearance along the sequence. The imitated securities are
those that have been underwritten by more than one bank. All issues of equity-linked and corporate derivative
securities are recorded by the SDC and span the period between 1985 and 2004.
Product Group Securities in the group Imitated securities Underwriters
Debt products RISRS. RISRS. Everen, Kemper.
Z         on convertible
debt
LYO  	 
 LY O NS. Merrill Lynch, Paine Webber.
Dividend paying convert-
ible debt
SIRENS, I  O NS. First Boston, Merrill Lynch.
Convertible preferred
products
PERCS, YES Shares, DECS,
ACES, X      , PRIDES,
PEPS, SAILS, STRYPES,
MARCS, PEPS, MEDS, Trust-
O
 iginated Convertible Pre-
ferreds, TRACES.
PERCS, X     s, Trust-
O
 iginated Convertible Pre-
ferreds.
Baird, Credit Suisse, DLJ, Dean Wit-
ter, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lazard
F r     Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Paine Webber, Robert-
son, Salomon-Smith Barney, UBS.
Short-term, income de-
ferring products FRAPS. FRAPS.




MIPS, EPICS, MIDS, T O PRS,
Q  IDS, Q UIPS, Q UICS, Res-
Caps,  O PRS.
MIPS, MIDS, T O   	 , Q  I  S,
Res-Caps.
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley-




Convertible MIPS, T   O  S,
Convertible T O   	  Q  Cs,
EPPICS, TRUPS, Convertible
Q  IPS.
Convertible T O   	 , TRUPS.
First Union Capital, Goldman Sachs, JP
Morgan, Keefe, Merrill Lynch, Morgan






tion Securities, CPNs, SUNS,
CUBS.
PERLS, SIRS, SMARTS, Equity
Participation Securities.
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman














O  	 . Deutsche Bank.
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Table I I I: Comparison of issues of equ ity-linked and corp orate derivative securities across generations
This tab le compares issues of  rst and later generation equ ity-linked and corp orate derivative secu-
rities. A ll such issues are recorded by the SDC and span the p eriod b etween 1985 and 2004. F irst
generation securities are those that app ear  rst in the sequence of innovation w ith in each product
group (Table I I). The im itated securities (Panel B ) are those that have b een underw ritten by more
that one bank.
Panel A : A ll issues of a ll equ ity-linked and corp orate derivatives
Number of M edian M ean Standard
observations deviation
Pro ceeds p er issue ($ m illions)
of  rst generation securities (1) 218 150:00 297:50 438:61
of later generations (2) 443 150:00 201:39 190:74
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) (3:92)

Underw riting fee (p ercentage)
of  rst generations (1) 163 1:25 1:72 1:07
of later generations (2) 355 3:15 2:77 1:01
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) ( 10:79)

Product life (issues p er security)
of  rst generations (1) 11 9:00 19:81 28:16
of later generations (2) 39 5:00 11:39 18:47
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) (1:18)
Panel B : A ll issues of im itated securities
Number of M edian M ean Standard
observations deviation
Pro ceeds p er issue (
$
m illions)
of  rst generation securities (1) 205 150:00 300:75 449:19
of later generations (2) 205 150:00 213:73 180:81
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) (2:57)

Underw riting fee (p ercentage)
of  rst generations (1) 154 1:19 1:70 1:09
of later generations (2) 160 3:15 2:94 0:69
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) ( 12:12)

Product life (issues p er security)
of  rst generations (1) 7 17 29:26 32:10
of later generations (2) 11 7 18:64 27:40
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) ( 0:75)
Time to im itation (issues b efore im itation)
of  rst generations (1) 7 3 3:86 3:53
of later generations (2) 11 2 1:91 0:83
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) (1:79)

Time to im itation (days b efore im itation)
of  rst generations (1) 7 231 320:86 355:75
of later generations (2) 11 198 588:55 772:01
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) ( 0:85)
Market share of innovator
of  rst generations (1) 7 0:70 0:69 0:20
of later generations (2) 11 0:50 0:49 0:21
T statisitc for (H0 : 1   2 = 0) (2:07)

a Estim ates fo llowed by ,  and  are statistica lly d i¤ erent from zero w ith 0.01, 0 .05 and 0.1 sign i cance
levels, resp ectively.
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Table IV: Issuers loyalty to underwriters
This table summarizes the issuers loyalty measure. The relative issuer loyalty at each issue
t of security g is measured by the propensity that the issuer, x, has had in the past to
choose bank b over its rivals b0 to underwrite g. The index is
LOY ALt;g;b;x =
#(issues between x and b)P
8b0in market g
#(issues between x and b0)
 
1
#(b0 in market g)
;
where #(issues between x and b) is the total number of past issues of any security since
1985 with the same issuer-underwriter pai 
P
8b0in market g
#(issues between x and b0) is the
sum of these counts for the same issuer over all banks that compete for security g and #(b0
in market g) is the number of such banks.
Number of Median Mean Standard
observations deviation
LOY ALTY
overall 328 0:000 0:096 0:251
in the same product class 334 0:000 0:075 0:234
  erall LOY ALTY
to the innovator (IN) 302 0:000 0:100 0:246
to imitators (IM) 26 0:000 0:053 0:303
T statisitc for (H0 : IN   IM = 0) (0:92)
Within the class LOY ALTY
to the innovator (IN) 302 0:000 0:080 0:232
to imitators (IM) 26 0:000 0:021 0:259
T statisitc for (H0 : IN   IM = 0) (1:23)
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and
0.1 signicance levels, respectively.
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Table V: Estimates of the imitation hazard rates model
This table shows the estimates of a model of the hazard rate of imitation of innovative securities.
The estimation uses all issues before imitation of all imitated equity-linked and corporate derivative
securities in SDC between 1985 and 2004. Every issue of every imitated security before imitation
is paired with its issue number and covariates. The model estimated with this data is
g;t = expf (0 + 1g + 
0
2xg;t + ")g;
where g;t is the probability that security g is imitated immediately after issue t given that it has
not yet been imitated. xgt includes characteristics of the market for security g specied below. The
parameters 0; 1; and 2 are estimated by maximum likelihood, using standard errors estimators
that are robustly consistent to heteroskedasticity and correlation within securities in the same
group. Standard errors are shown in brackets under the estimate. " is assumed to be log-normally
distributed. The estimates in Panel B corresponds to the same model where the time index, t; is
measured in calendar time (days).
Panel A: Time to imitation measured by issue number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation number  0:072  0:061  0:064  0:069  0:067  0:064
(g) (0:029) (0:027) (0:027) (0:031) (0:030) (0:029)
Total volume issued 8:980
( trillions) (2:46)
Total number of 0:006
issues (0:002)
Size of rst issue 0:490
( billions) (0:275)
Average size of previous 0:602 0:007
issues ( billions) (0:353) (0:026)
Standard deviation of previous 0:964
issues size ( billions) (0:378)
Constant 1:455 1:340 1:279 1:294 1:304 1:343
(0:167)(0:171)(0:179)(0:218)(0:215) (0:214)

bservations 48 48 48 48 48 48
2 statistic 5:98 40:46 64:83 15:16 11:02 21:31
P-value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Panel B: Time to imitation measured in days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation number  0:130  0:137  0:142  0:140  0:133  0:146
(g) (0:047)(0:045)(0:039)(0:061) (0:063) (0:073)
Total volume issued  5:750
( billions) (6:453)
Total number of  0:009
issues (0:007)












Constant 5:822 5:895 6:079 6:296 6:297 6:481
(0:192)(0:223)(0:314)(0:320)(0:268) (0:389)
bservations 48 48 48 48 48 48
2 statistic 7:57 12:00 33:01 7:88 9:64 18:01
P-value of 2 statistic 0:006 0:002 0 0:019 0:008 0
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
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Table VI: Economic signicance of the estimates of the imitation hazard rates
model
This table shows the estimated times of imitation, implied by the estimates in
Table V. The predicted median time for the imitators entry is 1
^
, where
^ = exp( (^0 + ^1g + ^
0
2xg;t)):
Panel A: Time to imitation measured by issue number
The estimated model used to predicted the median imitation issue number is
^ = exp( 1:304 + 0:067 g + 0:602 average size of previous issues):
Moments of the Generation
sample distribution of the
average previous issue size 1st 5th 10th 15th
1st quartile 3:627 2:776 1:988 1:423
(0:612) (0:266) (0:310) (0:410)
Median 3:842 2:941 2:105 1:507
(0:566) (0:200) (0:316) (0:437)
Mean 4:005 3:066 2:195 1:571
(0:541) (0:161) (0:330) (0:461)
3rd quartile 4:385 3:356 2:403 1:72
(0:533) (0:177) (0:395) (0:530)
Panel B: Time to imitation measured in days
The estimated model used to predicted the median imitation time, in days, is
^ = exp( 6:297 + 0:133 g + 0:002 average size of previous issues):
Moments of the Generation
sample distribution of the
average previous issue size 1st 5th 10th 15th
1st quartile 411:292 241:341 123:946 63:655
(81:107) (61:065) (64:620) (52:320)
Median 349:547 205:11 105:339 54:099
(56:289) (52:497) (56:859) (45:686)
Mean 310:766 182:354 93:652 48:097
(44:063) (48:288) (52:060) (41:483)
3rd quartile 240:643 141:207 72:52 37:244
(32:000) (42:457) (43:372) (33:745)
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signicance levels, respectively.
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Table VII: Estimates of the equilibrium underwriting fee models parameters
This table shows the estimates of the parameters of the equilibrium underwriting fee model, where the fee for issue t
of a generation g security is




zzb;t + l + t;g :
and INNb = 1 if the underwriter of issue t is the securitys innovator and  1 otherwise; LOY ALt;g;b;x measures
the past likelihood of the issuer to choose underwriter b by the time of issue t of security g;the vectors wt and zb;t
include issue-specic and bank-specic controls, respectively, and are listed below. The term l captures class-specic
pricing di¤erences, where l = fDebt (D), Convertible debt (CD), Preferred (P) and Convertible preferred (CP)g :We
estimate l and the parameters with a random (RE) and a xed e¤ects estimator and report the RE estimates, their
standard errors (underneath, in brackets), and the Hausman test statistic. The data includes all 237 issues of the 18
imitated equity-linked and corporate derivatives in the SDC data between 1985 and 2004.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 0:323 0:208 0:209 0:386 0:258 0:259
(0:117) (0:112) (0:112) (0:118) (0:114) (0:114)
2  0:020  0:022  0:023  0:021  0:023  0:023
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
, where LOY ALTY is:
(i) based on all same bank-issuer 0:167 0:147 0:175 0:164
pairs in the past (0:219) (0:205) (0:224) (0:210)
(ii) based on all same bank-issuer 0:135 0:172
pairs in the same class as g (0:217) (0:222)
w
Logarithm of proceeds  0:080  0:099  0:101  0:089  0:123  0:125
ﬀ million) (0:072) (0:071) (0:071) (0:074) (0:073) (0:073)
Maturity (in years, 0:007  0:002  0:002 0:003  0:004  0:005
D and CD only) (0:010) (0:009) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010)
Investment gﬁﬂﬃ (1 if yes,  0:704  0:272  0:268  0:623  0:183  0:178
0 if no, D and CD) (0:162) (0:168) (0:168) (0:167) (0:172) (0:172)
Share of equity-linked issues  2:278  1:101  1:122  2:496  1:394  1:426
by this bank (0:313) (0:414) (0:412) (0:322) (0:486) (0:482)
z
Share of all issues in the same 1:259 1:137 1:138 1:079 1:137 1:128
class as g by this bank (0:391) (0:606) (0:606) (0:401) (0:720) (0:718)
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(1986-2003)
0 3:400 2:107 2:130 3:550 2:596 2:636
(0:466) (0:493) (0:495) (0:490) (0:537) (0:540)
!"#

rvations 273 273 273 256 256 256
R2 0:465 0:583 0:582 0:487 0:605 0:605
Wald test 2 statistic 229:041 344:684 344:380 234:890 352:653 352:609
P-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Hausman test statistic 69:435 30:894 30:795 64:604 24:486 24:471
P-value 0:000 0:193 0:196 0:000 0:491 0:492
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and
0.1 signicance levels, respectively.
42
Table VIII: Economic signicance of the estimates of the pricing equation
This table shows the estimates of the expected duration of the innovators
advantage implied by the estimates of the underwriting fee model reported
in Table VII. The expected advantage duration for security g is the number
of issues after which the innovator and imitators compete at equal strentgh.
The estimated advantage is
q (g; t) = ^1INNb + ^2INNb  t g;
and it lasts for t =   ^1
^2g
issues. Each column uses the estimates of the




Generation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 16:036 9:323 9:282 18:661 11:428 11:375
(5:912) (4:923) (4:886) (5:904) (4:978) (4:94)
5 3:207 1:865 1:856 3:732 2:286 2:275
(1:182) (0:985) (0:977) (1:181) (0:996) (0:988)
10 1:604 0:932 0:928 1:866 1:143 1:138
(0:591) (0:492) (0:489) (0:59) (0:498) (0:494)
15 1:069 0:622 0:619 1:244 0:762 0:758
(0:394) (0:328) (0:326) (0:394) (0:332) (0:329)
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signicance levels, respectively.
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Table I%: Estimates of the equilibrium underwriting fee models parameters
This tab le shows the estim ates of the param eters of the equ ilibrium underw riting fee model. For columns 1 to 3,
the fee for issue t of a generation g security is










where INNb = 1 if the underw riter of issue t is the security s innovator and  1 otherw ise ' LOYALt;g;b;x
measures the past likelihood of the issuer to choose underw riter b by the tim e of issue t of security g;the vectors
wt and zb;t include issue-sp eci c and bank-sp eci c contro ls, resp ectively, and are listed b elow ' Ift>1g = 1
for a ll issues after the  rst, and zero otherw ise.The term l captures class-sp eci c pricing d i¤ erences, where
l = fDebt (D ), Convertib le debt (CD), Preferred (P) and Convertib le preferred (CP)g : For columns 4 to 6, the
fee for issue t of security g is






























 is the inverse m ills ratio derived from the hazard rate model of the tim e
to im itation in column 4 of Table V . We estim ate l and the param eters w ith a random (RE) and a xed e¤ ects
estim ator and rep ort the RE estim ates, their standard errors (underneath , in brackets), and the Hausman test
statistic . The data includes all 237 issues of the 18 im itated equ ity-linked and corp orate derivatives in the SDC
data b etween 1985 and 2004. The  rst model is estim ated w ith the fu ll sample and the second w ith all issues
after im itation has o ccured .
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 0:378 0:244 0:245 0:327 0:269 0:277
(0:120) (0:111) (0:111) (0:125) (0:113) (0:112)
2  0:024  0:025  0:025  0:017  0:022  0:022
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
, where LOY ALTY is:
(i) based on all same bank-issuer 0:128 0:107 0:329 0:163
pairs in the past (0:218) (0:197) (0:162) (0:140)
(ii) based on all same bank-issuer 0:096 0:197
pairs in the same class as g (0:207) (0:152)
w
Logarithm of proceeds  0:074  0:071  0:071 0:055  0:058  0:060
() million) (0:047) (0:043) (0:043) (0:061) (0:056) (0:056)
Maturity (in years,  0:994  1:384  1:381  0:006  0:004  0:005
D and CD only) (0:580) (0:528) (0:528) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007)
Investment grade? (1 if yes, 2:296 4:068 4:054  0:450  0:109  0:102
0 if no, D and CD) (2:257) (2:087) (2:086) (0:121) (0:113) (0:113)
Share of equity-linked issues  2:729  1:276  1:292  2:79  1:459  1:529
by this bank (0:308) (0:409) (0:407) (0:254) (0:396) (0:395)
z
Share of all issues in the same 1:675 1:240 1:239 1:396 1:643 1:619
class as g by this bank (0:434) (0:438) (0:440) (0:366) (0:371) (0:373)
Year dummies (1986-2003) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
 2:858  0:009 0:014
(inverse Mills ratio) (1:133) (1:122) (1:122)
0 2:951 1:673 1:686 1:956 2:197 2:263
(0:149) (0:499) (0:498) (0:540) (0:653) (0:649)
*bservations 273 273 273 207 207 207
R2 0:453 0:602 0:602 0:692 0:805 0:805
Wald test 2 statistic 218:360 374:050 373:850 483:430 816:580 818:290
P-value
Hausman test statistic 18:168 25:136 25:234 88:657 29:246 28:924
P-value 0:020 0:455 0:449 0:000 0:211 0:223
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
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Table + : Further evidence
Panel A of this table shows the frequencies of imitated and non-imitated securities conditional on whether
or not they are the rst generation in their group. There are 50 equity-linked and corporate derivative
securities in the SDC and of these, 11 are rst generation products. The 2 Pearson statistic is computed
under the null hypothesis is that there is no statistical association between whether the security is imitated
or not and whether the security is a rst generation or not. Panel B shows the distribution of the number
of times that a bank innovates along a given sequence of products conditional on whether or not the bank
was the rst innovator of the group. There are 61 bank-product group pairs for all the 50 equity-linked and
corporate derivative securities in the SDC and, of these pairs, 11 correspond to the banks that developed
the rst generation product in each group. The rest correspond to the banks that competed in the same
group either as imitators or as innovators of later generation products.
Panel A: was the security imitated ,
No Yes Total
First generation Number 4 7 11
securities Percentage 36:36% 63:64%
Later generation Number 29 11 39
securities Percentage 74:36% 25:64%
2 Pearson statistic = 4:9332- P-value = 0:026.
Panel B: do innovators p e . / 0 / 1 ,
Number of subsequent innovations by the
bank in the same group
0 1 2 3 4 Total
Banks that are Number 28 16 3 1 2 50
the group innovator Percentage 56:00% 32:00% 6:00% 2:00% 4:00%
Banks that are not Number 0 8 1 1 1 11









Figure 1: The conversion rate of a Preferred Equity Redeemable Stock (PERCS) as a
function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock
converts mandatorily after 3 years to one unit of common stock unless the common stock
appreciates above a cap of r percent. If after 3 years the common stock appreciates above
the cap, PERCS convert to less than one unit of common stock such that their conversion










Figure 2: The conversion rate of a Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock (DECS) as
a function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred
stock converts mandatorily after 3 years to one unit of common stock unless the common
stock appreciates within 0 and r percent: If the common stock appreciates within these
boundaries in 3 years, then DECS convert to less than one unit of common stock such that








Figure 3: Probability that the underwriter of the next issue is the product innovator (black
line) or its imitator (gray line) as a function of the quality di¤erential (q). This gure
illustrates the choice of an underwriter by the issuer of a new security. The black line
plots the probability that the issuer chooses the innovator, as a function of the di¤erence
between the quality of the underwriting service provided by the innovator or the imitator.
The gray line plots the probability that the issuer chooses the imitator. The larger the q,
the higher the probability that the innovator gets the next contract. For a large enough
q, then any issuer will prefer the innovator and the probability that the innovator gets
the mandate 1.
47
Figure 4: Empirical cumulative distribution function of the speed at which a security is
imitated. This gure illustrates the speed at which a security is imitated conditional on its
generation index. The speed of imitation is measured by the number issues it takes before
an imitator completes its rst issue. A security is said to be imitated if a bank other than
the innovator underwrites an issue using the same product structure. The dotted line is the
CDF corresponding to those imitated securities that were rst generation products, i.e.,
the rst product in a sequence of related products. The solid line is the CDF of the speed











Figure 5: Probabilities that a security is not imitated within t days from the date of
its rst issue (Pr(N > t)). The thick solid line corresponds to rst generation secu-
rities. The thin line corresponds to 5th generation securities and the dotted line to
10th generation securities. This gure shows the probability that a security is not im-
itated within t days of its rst issue, conditional on its generation index. The proba-
bility that imitation time, N; occurs after t, i.e., the survival rates S(t) =Pr (N > t),
is measured in the vertical axis and shown as a function of time which is shown in the
horizontal axis. The survival rate is given by S(t) = (  1
b
ln (bt)); where b is the es-
timated imitation hazard rate which is itself obtained from the estimated hazard rate
model: b= exp( 6:297 + 0:133  generation+ 0:002 mean prior issue size); andb= 1:273907: The thick solid line corresponds to the rst generation securities. The thin
line corresponds to the 5th generation securities and the dotted line to the 10th generation
securities.
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